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INTRODUCTION 
 
During a 2016 United States presidential debate, 
candidates were asked to address recent murders of 
unarmed black men at the hands of police. One question 
focused on implicit bias, or the notion that individuals can 
make subconscious judgments about others that 
ultimately affect their own actions. Then-candidate 
Hillary Clinton opined, “I think implicit bias is a problem 
for everyone, not just police. I think too many of us in our 
great country jump to conclusions about each other. All of 
us need to ask hard questions about, ‘Why are we feeling 
this way?’”1 In response, then-candidate Donald Trump 
maintained that “[Clinton] accuses the entire country—
including all of law enforcement—of implicit bias, 
essentially suggesting that everyone, including our police, 
are basically racist and prejudiced. . . . [S]he has such a 
low opinion of our citizens.”2 
Similar dialogue has unfolded across the United 
States. Modern social science reflects the existence of 
implicit bias,3 but many people either have not heard of 
the concept or mistakenly conflate it with overt 
prejudice.4 This ignorance extends to the judiciary—the 
institution that reveres Lady Justice, whose blindness 
                                               
* J.D., 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2012, 
Claremont McKenna College. With many thanks to Professor Charles 
Geyh, whose guidance and zeal spurred my own devotion to this 
issue. 
1 Mark Hensch, Clinton: We Must Fight ‘Implicit Bias’, THE HILL: 
BALLOT BOX (Sept. 26, 2016, 10:15 p.m.), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/297939-clinton-i-
think-implicit-bias-is-a-problem-for-everyone.  
2 Jenna Johnson, Two Days After the Debate: Trump Responds to 
Clinton’s Comment on Implicit Bias, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://wapo.st/2dEBrrB?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.71a831e1f7f2.  
3 See infra Part II. 
4 See infra Part IV. 
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establishes her fairness.5 Many judges are unaware of 
implicit biases and remain unwittingly subject to their 
own.6 Under the current framework of judicial ethics, 
judges are free to proceed without actively seeking to 
understand or address their subterranean imperfections.7 
To ensure that the judiciary performs its duties without 
bias, we must remove the stigma associated with implicit 
biases to allow for—and require—judges to address them. 
This Note will proceed in five parts. Part I will 
review societal expectations and statutory requirements 
for objectivity in the judiciary.  Part II will provide an 
overview of implicit bias—what it is, how it affects 
behavior, and how it can be measured. Part III will then 
assess the levels of implicit bias found in judges, followed 
by Part IV, which will review existing proposals aiming to 
curb the effects of those biases. Finally, Part V will 
present a novel solution that takes a fundamentally 
different approach to confronting the potential 
consequences of judges’ implicit biases. 
 
I. OBJECTIVITY IN THE JUDICIARY: WHY IT MATTERS 
 
Justice Cardozo once said that a judge can simply 
“disengage himself . . . of every influence that is personal 
or that comes from the particular situation which is 
presented to him, and base his judicial decisions on 
elements of an objective nature.”8 In this classic model of 
judicial neutrality, a judge can embody objectivity and 
impartiality so long as he or she consciously sets aside 
any personal biases.9 Judges themselves are proponents 
of this theory. Most—if not all—judges believe that they 
decide cases fairly, objectively, and in a way that 
harmonizes the facts and legal issues at hand.10 
                                               
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the 
Invention of Tradition: The Growing Importance of the Appearance of 
Judicial Neutrality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 573, 617 (2011) (quoting 
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 121 
(1920)). 
9 Id. at 617–18. 
10 Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the 
Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 693, 695 (2014). 
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Impartiality and objectivity are valued not only in 
practice, but also in appearance. The appearance of 
neutrality is just as important as actual neutrality in that 
the former establishes judicial legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public.11 “The modern sensitivity to the importance of 
appearances represents . . . an acknowledgment of the 
importance now generally accorded to attempts to explain 
the relationship between government and the governed in 
terms of a commitment of respect for the value of 
individual human dignity and equality.”12 In other words, 
“an appearance standard . . . better ensures procedural 
justice.”13 Procedural justice stems from the notion that 
the way an adjudicator handles a dispute affects the 
overall outcome for a party.14 Because a party’s trust in 
the system undergirds procedural justice, an unbiased 
result may not be ultimately just if the party perceives 
impropriety. 
It makes sense, then, that these norms have been 
codified. Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
focuses on impartiality. Rule 2.2 requires all judges to 
“perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 
impartially.”15 Rule 2.3 addresses bias, stating, “[a] judge 
shall perform the duties of judicial office, including 
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.”16 A 
comment to the same rule suggests that “[a] judge who 
manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the 
fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into 
disrepute.”17 And the United States Code requires that 
any justice or judge “shall disqualify himself in any 
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned” or “[w]here he has a personal bias or 
prejudice concerning a party . . . .”18 The purpose of these 
provisions is clear: they serve to protect the legitimacy of 
the judiciary and safeguard procedural justice for citizens. 
But what if one’s biases aren’t easy to detect or eradicate? 
                                               
11 See generally Oakes & Davies, supra note 8. 
12 Id. at 623–24. 
13 Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 1951, 1991 (2013). 
14 Id. at 1983. 
15 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
16 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
17  Id. at cmt. 1. 
18 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). 
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II. DEFINING AND MEASURING IMPLICIT BIAS 
 
A.  What is Implicit Bias? 
 
Known as “implicit biases,” these hidden biases 
involve “stereotypical associations so subtle that people 
who hold them might not even be aware of them.”19 Not 
only do they exist, but they are quite prevalent; most 
people harbor implicit biases—including individuals who 
consciously seek to embrace equality.20  
Implicit biases stem from the mental schemas all 
humans develop in learning to process the complexity of 
the world.21 Heuristics—mental shortcuts used by default 
in subconscious decision-making—have long been held to 
operate in the minds of all people.22 These subconscious 
algorithms developed through evolution to allow the 
human mind to more efficiently process stimuli.23 In other 
words, “to simplify the complex flood of information from 
the world, we tend to categorize objects, people, and 
occurrences into groups, types, or categories . . . so that 
we can treat non-identical stimuli as if they were 
equivalent.”24 Because our beliefs are heavily influenced 
by culture, and yet our neural development is not, many 
heuristics that may once have proved useful actually 
misfire today.25 Our latent biases become “the price we 
pay for such efficiency.”26 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & 
Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009). 
20 Id. at 1197. 
21 Shawn C. Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, JUV. & FAM. JUST. 
TODAY, Summer 2009, at 16, 17, 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/ImplicitBias.pdf. 
22 See Craig E. Jones, The Troubling New Science of Legal Persuasion: 
Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decision-Making, 41 ADVOC. Q. 49, 
56 (2013). 
23 See id. at 57. 
24 Negowetti, supra note 10, at 707. 
25 Jones, supra note 22, at 57. 
26 Negowetti, supra note 10, at 710. 
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B. Measuring Implicit Bias: The Implicit 
Association Test 
 
Because implicit biases are inherently latent, 
measuring them seems far from straightforward. Despite 
this difficulty, researchers at Harvard’s Project Implicit 
developed the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which has 
become the gold standard for measuring implicit bias.27 
The IAT measures the strength of subconscious 
associations by comparing the amount of time an 
individual takes to make them.28 Consider being asked to 
read two lists: one, comprised of a list of colors, each 
written in its namesake ink (for example, “blue” written 
in blue ink); the second, listing colors written in randomly 
colored inks (for example, “red” written in yellow ink). If 
you suspect that the first list might take less time for 
most people to read than the second, you are right—
because individuals subconsciously associate colors with 
their names, being asked to perform a task incongruous 
with those associations takes more time.29 This latency is 
the exact gauge by which the IAT measures implicit bias. 
How does the IAT actually work? The “Race IAT,” 
which tests for implicit biases toward people of color, 
provides an explicit example of the IAT’s controlled 
performance. Rachlinski describes the process as follows: 
 
First, researchers present participants with a 
computer screen that has the words “White or 
Good” in the upper left-hand corner of the 
screen and “Black or Bad” in the upper right. . . 
.[O]ne of four types of stimuli will appear in the 
center of the screen: white people’s faces, black 
people’s faces, good (positive) words, or bad 
(negative) words. . . . [P]articipants [are 
instructed to] press a designated key on the left 
side of the computer when a white face or a good 
word appears and press a designated key on the 
right side of the computer when a black face or 
a bad word appears. . . . Then, the computer is 
                                               
27 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1198. 
28 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 953 (2006). 
29 See J. Ridley Stroop, Studies of Interference in Serial Verbal 
Reactions, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 643, 659–60 (1935). 
           Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality       [7:2 
 
 
269
programmed to switch the spacial location of 
“good” and “bad” so that the words “White or 
Bad” appear in the upper left-hand corner and 
“Black or Good” appear in the upper right. 
[Participants then repeat the same process 
with the new opposite pairings.]30 
 
Ultimately, researchers have found that many 
Americans show a strong “white preference” on this test, 
as their response time is much faster in the first task 
(associating “white” with “good” and “black” with “bad”) 
than in the second (associating “white” with “bad” and 
“black” with “good”).31 Approximately seventy-five percent 
of all individuals who have taken the IAT through Project 
Implicit’s website have demonstrated white preference.32 
This phenomenon is not limited to white individuals; 
Project Implicit reports that its research consistently 
shows that half of black individuals who have taken the 
Race IAT have also demonstrated a white preference (the 
remainder vary between showing no preference and black 
preference).33 While someone taking the test may believe 
that they harbor no biases toward people of color, their 
response times may indicate otherwise. 
 
C. The Effects of Implicit Bias 
 
While the acquisition of implicit biases is normal, 
implicit biases can be “more dangerous and pernicious 
than . . . bigotry because [they are] ephemeral and 
difficult to eradicate.”34 Individuals inevitably (if  
unwittingly) act on these biases. While implicit biases 
implicate a wide variety of traits, journalist Nicholas 
Kristof describes the phenomena best when discussing 
implicit racial bias: 
                                               
30 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1198–99. 
31 Id. at 1199. 
32 MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: 
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 47 (2013). 
33 Project Implicit, FAQs, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq1
8 (last visited Nov. 16, 2017). 
34 L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the 
Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 892 (2017). 
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 [R]acial stereotyping remains ubiquitous, and 
. . . the challenge is not a small number of 
twisted white supremacists but something 
infinitely more subtle and complex: People who 
believe in equality but who act in ways that 
perpetuate bias and inequality.35 
 
The harmful effects of these biases can be 
compounded by peripheral circumstances. When 
circumstances appear ambiguous, an implicit bias might 
be magnified. 36 The same is true if an individual lacks the 
time or the cognitive capacity to think deeply in a given 
moment. 37 For example, whites have demonstrated more 
activation in the region of the brain associated with fear 
when they see black faces;38 this innate bias in white 
individuals can be recognized on its face for the 
potentially serious consequences it could wreak on 
innocent black individuals. 
So how do these biases ultimately manifest 
themselves? For their seemingly sterile origins in 
neurology, they can have widespread tangible effects. In 
healthcare, physicians’ implicit biases against black 
patients have resulted in fewer recommendations for 
treatment of black patients than for similarly-situated 
white patients;39 the same holds true for overweight 
patients.40 In a study on employment decision-making, 
hiring managers demonstrated implicit racial bias, even 
                                               
35 Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Is Everyone a Little Bit Racist?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2kavMcg.  
36 Erik J. Girvan, When Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial 
Realism in Antidiscrimination Law, 94 OR. L. REV. 359, 375 (2016). 
37 Id. 
38 Gregory S. Parks & Andre M. Davis, Confronting Implicit Bias: An 
Imperative for Judges in Capital Prosecutions, 42 HUM. RTS. 22, 22 
(2016). 
39 Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long H. 
Ngo, Kristel L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis 
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
1231, 1235 (2007). 
40 Gina Kolata, Why Do Obese Patients Get Worse Care? Many Doctors 
Don’t See Past the Fat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/2d2e7Bt.  
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when the same individuals purported to value equality.41 
In policing, more force has been used by officers arresting 
black children than when arresting white children.42 If 
these insidious effects can permeate other professions 
that demand integrity, how susceptible is the judiciary? 
 
III. IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE JUDICIARY 
 
Despite the norms and expectations set forth in 
Part I, judges may not have the capacity to be fully 
objective.43 In 1947, John P. Frank—a former law clerk to 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black—noted that “‘a 
more recent humility has prompted the recognition’ of the 
possibility that ‘human judges’ may succumb to ‘less 
tangible prejudices’ and thereby deny justice.”44 
 
A. Recent Research & Outcomes 
 
Misfiring heuristics can exert marginal influence 
over legal outcomes, but they have the capacity to fully 
subvert mental calculations. As a result, these misfiring 
heuristics can cause judges to render fully irrational 
decisions.45 Recent studies have demonstrated that 
seemingly irrelevant factors have statistically had 
significant effects on legal outcomes. For example, judges 
who had recently contemplated their own deaths were 
more likely to make conservative decisions; appellate 
judges who were temporally further from their last meal 
were more likely to affirm; and judges in general were 
more likely to side on behalf of the party who argued 
                                               
41 See generally Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: 
Real World Evidence, (Inst. for the Study of Lab. Discussion Paper 
No. 2764, 2007); see also John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, 
Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 315, 318 (2000). 
42 Girvan, supra note 36, at 374 (citing Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew 
Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison Lewis Di Leone, Carmen Marie 
Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: 
Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 539–40 (2014)). 
43 See generally Jones, supra note 22. 
44 Oakes & Davies, supra note 8, at 616–17 (quoting John P. Frank, 
Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605, 618–19 (1947)). 
45 Jones, supra note 22, at 53. 
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first.46 Something as insignificant as an attorney’s dress 
can also play a role in judicial decision-making.47 
These irrational correlations are not limited to seemingly 
innocuous factors; studies have shown disparities in legal 
outcomes based on a defendant’s race alone. In one study, 
researchers found that judges set bail at amounts twenty-
five percent higher and sentences at lengths twelve 
percent longer for black defendants than for similarly 
situated white defendants.48 In another study, 
researchers studied 522 motions for summary judgment 
decided by 431 federal district court judges and found that 
there was roughly a fifty percent difference between white 
and minority judges who decided employment civil rights 
claims involving white plaintiffs.49 A third study 
demonstrated that, in cases involving white victims, a 
black defendant with strong Afrocentric features was 
twice as likely to receive the death sentence than a 
defendant with weak Afrocentric features.50 A final study 
demonstrated that the composition of panels in Voting 
Rights Act cases can affect the cases’ outcomes, as panels 
with at least one black judge were notably more likely to 
vote for liability than panels without any black judges 
(even when controlling for political predispositions).51 Do 
these studies demonstrate judicial susceptibility to 
implicit biases, or are other factors at play? 
 
                                               
46 Id. at 50. 
47 Id. at 51. 
48 Ian Ayers & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination 
in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 992 (1994); see also David B. 
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 
(2001). 
49 Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: 
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 313, 344 (2012). 
50 Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns, 
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived 
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing 
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006). See generally William T. 
Pizzi, Irene V. Blair & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in Sentencing 
on the Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327 (2005). 
51 Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1493, 1536 (2008). 
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B. Judges and the IAT 
 
Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski and his colleagues 
conducted the first study examining 133 judges from 
three different regions of the United States for implicit 
bias.52 The judges’ IAT results demonstrated that judges 
harbor implicit racial biases at rates consistent with the 
rest of the population.53 Later, when the same judges 
were given hypothetical scenarios and asked to render a 
decision regarding the theoretical defendant’s crime, the 
judges’ implicit biases manifested themselves. After being 
primed to assume (but not specifically told) the 
defendant’s race, judges primed to perceive the defendant 
as black imposed harsher punishments than those judges 
who had not been primed regarding the defendant’s 
race.54 This study was followed by another, conducted by 
Professor Justin Levinson, that demonstrated similar 
judicial bias against Jews and individuals of Asian 
descent.55 
While these implicit biases may seem predictable 
from a sociological perspective, they fly in the face of the 
judicial identity, and judges can be blindsided by their 
IAT results. An unnamed federal district court judge 
reflected, “I was eager to take the test. I knew I would 
‘pass’ with flying colors. I didn’t. . . . I ultimately realized 
that the problem of implicit bias is a little recognized and 
even less addressed flaw in our legal system.”56 
Rachlinksi does not recommend using the IAT as a 
“measure of qualification to serve on the bench,” 
especially since judges can overcome implicit bias to a 
certain extent.57 After all, should all judges be removed 
for harboring implicit biases, “there might be no one left 
to judge.”58 But given the fact that judges both harbor and 
                                               
52 See generally Rachlinksi et al., supra note 19. 
53 Id. at 1221. 
54 Id. at 1223. 
55 Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging 
Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 
FLA. L. REV. 63, 104 (2017). 
56 Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in 
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the 
Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 149, 150 (2010). 
57 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1228. 
58 Bruce A. Green, Legal Discourse and Racial Justice: The Urge to 
Cry “Bias!”, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 184 (2015). 
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act on these biases, what can be done to combat their 
effects? 
 
IV. CURRENT SUGGESTIONS & POTENTIAL CAVEATS 
 
Given the prevalence of implicit bias among judges, 
many researchers have begun to propose approaches to 
eradicating them. This Part of the Note will explore some 
of those suggestions and their potential caveats. 
 
A. Education 
 
As the aforementioned federal district judge noted, 
implicit bias is a problem that has yet to be fully 
recognized.59 To this end, most researchers begin by 
suggesting that a first step in eliminating the effects of 
implicit bias involves recognizing that the problem 
exists.60 Judge Mark Bennett, who sits on the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, noted 
that, in his work training judges on implicit bias, “only a 
tiny percentage—far less than [one percent]—have been 
aware of racial implicit bias and IAT scores[.]”61 This 
ignorance in itself not only keeps the problem from being 
addressed, but it can actually perpetuate the issue. In 
fact, the concept of colorblindness—the belief that race 
has effectively become a non-factor in the lives of 
Americans—can actually generate greater expressions of 
bias on both explicit and implicit levels.62 
How should one raise awareness, then? Several 
researchers advocate for widespread IAT testing to raise 
awareness, followed by targeted training to equip judges 
with the ability to mitigate their own biases.63 
The caveats of this approach are not without merit. 
For starters, most people—including judges—believe that 
they exceed the norm in their ability to control their own 
                                               
59 Bennett, supra note 56, at 150. 
60 Jones, supra note 22, at 114; Richardson, supra note 28, at 887. 
61 Mark W. Bennett, The Implicit Racial Bias in Sentencing: The Next 
Frontier, 126 YALE L. J. F. 391, 404 (2017). 
62 Richardson, supra note 34, at 888. 
63 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1228; Richardson, supra note 34, 
at 888. 
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biases.64 This inclination illuminates another heuristic 
known as egocentric bias.65 In the words of Judge 
Bennett, “Judges, like all vertebrates, have visual blind 
spots . . . . We also have cognitive blind spot bias—that is, 
the ability to see bias in others, but not in ourselves.”66 
The judges in Rachlinski’s study were asked to rate their 
ability to be objective and “avoid racial prejudice in 
decisionmaking” relative to the other participating 
judges.67 Ninety-seven percent of the judges rated 
themselves in the top half.68 Judge Bennett conducted his 
own study, and, like Rachlinski, found that “92% of senior 
federal district judges, 87% of non-senior federal district 
judges, [and] 72% of magistrate judges . . . ranked 
themselves in the top 25% of respective colleagues in their 
ability to make decisions free from racial bias.”69 Judges, 
even when equipped with knowledge of and training on 
implicit biases, could remain overconfident in their own 
objectivity and thus struggle to combat the issue. 
In addition to egocentric bias, trouble lies in the 
fact that the judges believe themselves to be objective. 
Studies have shown that “when a person believes himself 
to be objective, such belief licenses him to act on his 
biases.”70 One study involved a group tasked with 
providing performance evaluations based on candidate 
profiles.71 When faced with two candidates with identical 
qualifications, but of opposite genders, a control group 
provided statistically similar evaluations for both 
candidates.72 But the experimental group, which had been 
primed to believe in its own objectivity, evaluated the 
                                               
64 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1225–26. 
65 Jones, supra note 22, at 72. 
66 Bennett, supra note 61, at 397. 
67 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1225–26. 
68 Id. 
69 Bennett, supra note 61, at 397. 
70 Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana 
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, 
Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012). 
71 Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s 
True”: Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 
104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210–
11 (2007). 
72 Id. 
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male candidate higher than the female candidate.73 Belief 
in one’s own objectivity can actually subvert it, especially 
given the rates of egocentric bias discussed in Bennett’s 
and Rachlinski’s studies. These findings demonstrate 
that, while education may serve as a valuable tool to 
combat implicit bias, education alone will likely not 
suffice. 
 
B. Rational Deliberation & Taking the Time 
 
 Another set of proposed solutions capitalizes on the 
fact that “rational deliberation” with others can mitigate 
the effects of implicit biases.74 Any quick-thinking 
decision shrouded by bias can be identified when a judge 
spends time discussing his or her reasoning; a biased 
decision can then be avoided after the judge or panel of 
judges realizes that it might not be the most rational 
outcome. For Professor Craig Jones, this approach takes 
the form of a heavier judicial reliance on bench 
memoranda and conferences with court attorneys.75 For 
Rachlinski, such rational deliberation entails the 
reinstatement of three-judge panels where possible.76 And 
Professor L. Song Richardson sees a solution merely in 
judges consciously taking the time and exercising the 
diligence that each defendant deserves.77  
While these solutions could conceivably succeed if 
put into practice, their impracticalities might outweigh 
their potential benefits. Judicial groupthink might 
minimize the potential benefit of intracourt collaboration; 
as a class of individuals that remains largely homogenous, 
judges may remain ill-equipped to fully “appreciate their 
decisions from the perspectives of diverse litigants.”78 
Rachlinski also admits that three-judge panels have 
largely been abandoned in jurisdictions across the country 
because they drive up court costs and are perceived as 
                                               
73 Id. 
74 Daniel A. Yudkin & Jay Van Bavel, The Roots of Implicit Bias, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2huFHbl.  
75 Jones, supra note 22, at 119–20. 
76 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1231. 
77 Richardson, supra note 34, at 889. 
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inefficient (why put three heads on a case when one will 
do?).79 But the biggest caveat that spans each iteration 
above is the fact that “[j]udges, prosecutors, and defense 
lawyers in many criminal courtrooms across the country 
are laboring under the weight of far too many cases to 
give each one individualized treatments.”80 As a result, 
“professionals struggle to quickly sort defendants into 
those who are deserving of time and attention and those 
who are not,” which results in the manifestation of 
implicit biases.81 While rational deliberation could clearly 
combat the manifestation of implicit biases, it remains 
unclear that it can serve as a standalone solution, given 
its impracticality. 
 
C. Diversifying the Bench & Judicial Perspective 
 
Yet other proposals entail diversifying both the 
bench and judicial perspective. Professor Rebecca Lee has 
proposed that “[a] bench consisting of judges with diverse 
characteristics and from diverse life paths will better 
relate to a wider range of litigants.”82 And while judicial 
diversity initiatives have emerged,83 their beneficial value 
for the specific purpose of combating implicit bias remains 
to be seen. Rachlinski’s study demonstrated that 
“[e]xposure to a group of esteemed black colleagues 
apparently is not enough to counteract the societal 
influences that lead to implicit biases.”84 
Similarly, Professor Negowetti suggests empathy, 
or “an ‘imaginative experiencing of the situation of 
another,’” as a tool judges can employ to consciously 
combat the effects of their own implicit biases.85 Yet this 
perspective-taking might fall prey to the same issues as 
                                               
79 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1231. 
80 Richardson, supra note 34, at 875. 
81 Id. 
82 Rebecca K. Lee, Judging Judges: Empathy as the Litmus Test for 
Impartiality, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 176 (2013). 
83 See generally Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Monique Chase & Emma 
Greenman, Improving Judicial Diversity, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE (2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Improving_Ju
dicial_Diversity_2010.pdf.  
84 Rachlinski et al., supra note 19, at 1227. 
85 Negowetti, supra note 10, at 725–29 (citing Lynne N. Henderson, 
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1581 (1987)); see also 
Richardson, supra note 28, at 884. 
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both implicit bias training and deliberate rationalization: 
judges can be overconfident in their own ability to identify 
biases, and they may not have the time or mental space to 
thoroughly vet each situation. 
 
D. The Overarching Caveat: Defensiveness 
 
 While the above solutions represent noble attempts 
to combat the effects of implicit biases, they are not 
without their own shortfalls. They also share an 
additional, particularly damaging caveat: the potential for 
defensiveness on the part of the implicitly biased. 
 The exchange between Hillary Clinton and Donald 
Trump featured in this Note’s introduction illustrates the 
confusion that exists around implicit bias. Sociological 
research is well-established that implicit biases exist 
across the board,86 but societal norms have yet to embrace 
the “normalcy” of the concept. As a result, mere 
suggestion that one might harbor implicit biases can 
serve as the worst kind of character assassination. In 
such situations, people “protest what they see as a 
character smear.”87 Vice President Mike Pence, in 
responding to allegations that police officers’ implicit 
biases may lead to more shootings of black individuals, 
suggested that such “accusations” actually “demean law 
enforcement.”88 Writer David French asserted that one 
can “indict entire communities as bigoted” by invoking the 
concept of implicit biases.89 And when Judge Shira 
Scheindlin held the stop-and-frisk policy of the New York 
Police Department to be unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, her “findings must have stung, not simply 
because she ruled against the City, but because she found 
that the conduct of the police and the City were 
influenced by unconscious racial bias.”90 
 Judges are particularly susceptible to 
defensiveness, as the suggestion of implicit bias is 
synonymous with questioning one’s ability to do one’s job. 
One case exemplifies this pattern. After a recent case 
                                               
86 See supra Part II. 
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involving a white police officer who shot and killed an 
unarmed black man, the officer was found not guilty of 
murder despite what critics felt to be overwhelming 
evidence of guilt.91 In the written opinion for the case, St. 
Louis Circuit Judge Timothy Wilson wrote, “The Court 
observes, based on its nearly 30 years on the bench, that 
an urban heroin dealer not in possession of a firearm 
would be an anomaly.”92 Yet when faced with questions 
about implicit bias, Judge Wilson’s colleagues were quick 
to defend his “objectivity.” “He’s very methodical and a 
very objective judge,” said Jack Garvey, a lawyer and 
former St. Louis Circuit Judge, “I don’t think he’s 
ideological.”93 Similarly, St. Louis defense attorney Joel 
Schwartz reflected, “My feeling on Judge Wilson is he’s a 
man who will do the right thing.”94 Implicit in these 
reactions is the stigma associated with harboring an 
implicit bias. 
Current sociological research reflects society’s 
tendency toward defensiveness when faced with implicit 
bias feedback; indeed, defensiveness may be an 
individual’s first reaction.95 In one recent study, 
participants took the Race IAT and were asked for their 
reactions upon seeing their results.96 Roughly two-thirds 
of the participants who displayed a bias on the IAT 
attributed their outcomes to factors unrelated to their 
own mental associations.97 The study showed that the 
                                               
91 See Shibani Mahtani, St. Louis Protests Follow After Officer Found 
Not Guilty of 2011 Killing of Black Man, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2017, 
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92 Missouri v. Stockley, No. 1622-CR02213-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2017). 
93 Melissa Matthews, Jason Stockley Verdict: How Bias May Have 
Influenced Judge Wilson’s Ruling, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:21 
p.m.), http://www.newsweek.com/judge-wilson-implicit-bias-acquittal-
666231.  
94 Id. 
95 Jennifer L. Howell & Kate A. Ratliff, Not Your Average Bigot: The 
Better-Than-Average Effect and Defensive Responding to Implicit 
Association Test Feedback, 56 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 127 (2017). 
96 Margo J. Monteith, Corrine I. Voils & Leslie Ashburn-Nardo, 
Taking a Look Underground: Detecting, Interpreting, and Reacting to 
Implicit Racial Biases, 19 SOCIAL COGNITION 395, 407–08 (2001). 
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larger the discrepancy between an individual’s self-
perceived and demonstrated biases, the more likely that 
individual was to externalize their results and blame 
factors unrelated to race.98 As a result, individuals with 
the highest levels of bias were the least likely to feel 
guilty or motivated to address their biases.99 A second 
study demonstrated that individuals with a stronger race 
preference on the IAT ultimately expressed more negative 
attitudes toward the test.100 And a third study, which ties 
directly back to egocentric bias, demonstrated that 
individuals who believed themselves to be “better than 
average” in terms of avoiding biases were most 
susceptible to responding defensively when IAT results 
showed otherwise.101 
Such defensiveness is likely tied to societal stigma 
surrounding implicit bias. IAT results “may produce 
unexpected and undesired feedback” that ultimately could 
prompt an increase in “avoidance of that feedback.”102 As 
a result, individuals who receive undesirable IAT 
feedback “may dismiss or derogate it or deny it 
altogether,”103 likely in an effort to downplay what they 
perceive to be a character flaw as opposed to an innate 
tendency. 
So what measures can be taken to lessen the 
stigma? Chief Justice Mark Cady of the Iowa Supreme 
Court recently addressed this issue, noting, “Implicit bias 
is not racism or bigotry and must not be viewed as such. 
It involves a human condition and forces separate from 
racism and will perpetuate injustice and inequity until it 
can be meaningfully addressed.”104 His words stress the 
                                               
98 Id. at 411. 
99 Id. 
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importance of removing the stigma of racism from implicit 
bias; only then will judges feel fully vindicated and begin 
acknowledging the extent of the problem. As Judge 
Bennett and Professor Richardson noted earlier, 
identifying manifestations of implicit bias as a problem 
needing redress is the first step toward that redress. 
 
V. NORMALIZATION & UPDATING THE MODEL CODE 
 
All proposed solutions mentioned above require 
judges to take conscious action at the outset of hearing 
cases and rendering decisions. As previously discussed, 
the potential for defensiveness may inhibit the benefits of 
these solutions. Instead, I propose a solution that begins 
to combat implicit biases by first addressing the stigma 
that continues to inhibit meaningful discussions of the 
problem. Once the stigma surrounding implicit biases is 
eliminated, the existing proposals can fully realize their 
potential in combating the effects of implicit bias. 
 
A. Defining Normalization 
 
Normalization is the process by which society 
begins to perceive a given behavior or trait as “normal.” In 
other words, it involves a “redefinition of modern 
discourse to allow extreme views to be considered 
normal.”105 Like implicit bias, normalization is a 
subconscious process that can have a powerful, but 
completely hidden, influence on an individual’s actions 
and beliefs.106 It is ultimately “the process through which 
wisdom becomes conventional and utopian ideals slam 
against questions of feasibility.”107 
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Normalization can be dangerous—if one routinely 
experiences violence, for example, it can become a “new 
normal” that demotivates the individual from finding a 
way out. But normalization can also be used as a tool for 
change. Groups have made conscious (and successful) 
attempts to manipulate the norm in an effort to change 
attitudes.  For example, extended efforts have been made 
to normalize recycling108 and mental illness.109 
In the case of recycling, normalization initiatives 
stemmed from a desire to see certain behaviors 
increase.110 But in the case of mental illness, the push for 
normalization stemmed from a desire to eradicate a 
stigma.111 A stigma “refer[s] to an attribute that is deeply 
discrediting” or a “special kind of relationship between 
attribute and stereotype.”112 One specific type of stigma 
involves “blemishes of individual character perceived as 
weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, 
treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty.”113 
Like mental illness, the concept of implicit bias is 
plagued with stigma. The current norm still involves an 
expectation for unbiased behavior; this expectation is 
especially heightened for judges. So, if a judge were 
inclined to openly confront his or her own implicit white 
preference, for example, this egalitarian motive could 
easily be overshadowed by a stigma assigned for bias. As 
discussed, such a stigma has strong—if not fatal—
consequences in the judiciary. 
But by striving to make the concept of implicit bias 
“normal,” judges would become free to engage against it 
rather than denying its existence altogether for self-
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preservation. No longer would the previously proposed 
proposals face backlash. But how does one initiate 
normalization? 
 
B. Revisiting the Model Code 
 
Recall that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
requires judges to operate “without bias.”114 Given the 
inherent nature of implicit biases, operating fully without 
bias is not entirely possible. After all, Americans, on 
average, demonstrate a strong white preference,115 and 
evidence demonstrates that judges are no different.116 
To begin the process of normalizing implicit bias in 
the judiciary, I propose an addition to the comments 
under Model Rule 2.3. While the Rule itself should 
continue to require judges to “perform the duties of 
judicial office . . . without bias,”117 a comment appended to 
the Rule should reflect the unilateral existence of implicit 
biases and the need for judges to endeavor to combat 
them. First, such a change would signal to judges the 
ubiquity of implicit biases, which begins to normalize the 
concept at no one individual’s expense. Additionally, 
absent such a comment, one might interpret the Rule as 
providing that a confrontation of one’s own implicit biases 
could result in discipline, as such confrontation would 
acknowledge the existence of bias in the first place. 
Finally, this comment would place a burden on judges to 
confront their implicit biases; this affirmative duty does 
not yet exist, potentially to the detriment of countless 
parties whose outcomes are affected by manifestations of 
judges’ implicit biases. 
While this comment would not be widely 
actionable—it would be very difficult to prove that a judge 
actively avoided either learning of his or her own implicit 
biases or attempting to combat them—its import lies in 
its symbolism. Creating an environment in which judges 
are exposed to the concept of implicit bias (and the 
faultlessness of unknowingly harboring them) has the 
potential to reduce collective defensiveness. As implied by 
the studies discussed earlier, reduction in the stigma or 
                                               
114 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
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“blame” surrounding implicit bias would only accelerate 
efforts to eradicate it. 
 
C. An Important Note 
 
 A proposal to normalize implicit biases may be 
criticized for catering to white privilege, as it is centered 
around an effort to make implicitly-biased individuals—
by the numbers, namely whites—feel comfortable in 
addressing racial issues and thus “trivializ[ing] [whites’] 
history of brutality towards people of color and perverts 
the reality of that history.”118 Creating a comment in the 
Code of Judicial Conduct aimed at normalizing implicit 
bias may allow whites to “protect their moral character 
against what they perceive as accusation and attack while 
deflecting any recognition of culpability or need of 
accountability.”119 
 This perspective should not be understated. While 
this proposal does minimize the personal culpability 
behind the development of implicit biases, it does so with 
two important underpinnings. First, this proposal has the 
same ultimate goal as that expressed by DiAngelo: that 
“[a]ll white people build the stamina to sustain conscious 
and explicit engagement with race,”120 so that all forms of 
bias can ultimately be eradicated. Second, this proposal is 
truly aimed at implicit biases; it should not be read to 
absolve any explicit biases. Those who harbor implicit 
biases, by definition, do not know at the outset that they 
exist, and this proposal sets the groundwork for an 
environment conducive to their confrontation. The 
proposed comment would compel judges to unilaterally 
define and confront their own biases, and it would remove 
plausible deniability as an option for those who may have 
wished to remain willfully blind. While solutions that 
better confront white privilege must be explored, the 
proposed comment can be seen as a crucial first step. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Judge Jerome Frank, sitting on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, once opined,       
“If . . . ‘bias’ and ‘partiality’ be defined to mean the total 
absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then 
no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The 
human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of 
paper.”121 It must become normal to accept that judges—
like all humans and, indeed, vertebrates—harbor implicit 
biases; acceptance of these biases at the outset is the 
necessary first step in order to fully eradicate them. 
 
                                               
121 Oakes & Davies, supra note 8, at 580 (quoting In re JP Linahan 
Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943)). 
